{"id":1255,"date":"2008-07-05T19:20:47","date_gmt":"2008-07-05T17:20:47","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blog.zeit.de\/joerglau\/2008\/07\/05\/china-ist-eine-insel_1255"},"modified":"2008-07-05T19:20:47","modified_gmt":"2008-07-05T17:20:47","slug":"china-ist-eine-insel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blog.zeit.de\/joerglau\/2008\/07\/05\/china-ist-eine-insel_1255","title":{"rendered":"China ist eine Insel"},"content":{"rendered":"

Manchmal findet man solche einen Gedanken, der einem pl\u00f6tzlich vieles aufschlie\u00dft, was vorher kaum verst\u00e4ndlich scheint – wie etwa das chinesische strategische Selbstbild in der heutigen Welt.<\/p>\n

\tChina ist n\u00e4mlich eigentlich eine Insel, obwohl es Grenzen mit 14 Nationen hat. Seine Bev\u00f6lkerung, seine bebaubare Ackerfl\u00e4che, seine Natursch\u00e4tze und seine Wirtschaftskraft sind in einem vergleichsweise kleinen Teil der Staatsfl\u00e4che\u00a0 konzentriert. Im S\u00fcdosten, Osten, Norden und Nordwesten bilden Meer, Gebirge, W\u00fcste und Steppe nat\u00fcrliche Grenzen. So sieht man es auf dieser Karte (danke, Strange Maps<\/a>!):<\/p>\n

\t\"china_2d00_island_2d00_400_5f00_2.jpg\"<\/a><\/p>\n

\tThe Chinese heartland<\/strong>, pictured here as the part of China above water, is favourable to agriculture and has traditionally held the bulk of the Chinese population (i.e. the ethnic Han, whom we think of as \u2018the\u2019 Chinese); Over a billion people live here, in an area half the size of the US. The heartland\u2019s northern part is dominated by the Yellow River and speaks Mandarin, the southern part by the Yangtze River and by Cantonese.<\/em><\/p>\n

\tPopulation pressure has always pushed China to expand into Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia and Manchuria<\/strong>. Another factor is the historical threat emanating from this non-Han \u2018shell\u2019 surrounding the Han heartland, for example from the nomad Mongol horsemen that have long threatened and occasionally dominated the sedentary, agricultural Han.<\/em><\/p>\n

\tIn the past, when the Chinese state was strong, it managed to conquer and rule these outlying areas, providing a defensive buffer<\/strong> for the heartland. When central authority was weak, these fringes broke off \u2013 leaving the heartland vulnerable to invasion. China is strong again, even up to the point where the fringes now are the target of large migrations of Han, much to the chagrin of the native peoples.<\/em><\/p>\n

\tThis Han-ification<\/em> of the Chinese fringe does not necessarily imply that the Chinese have more contact with the countries beyond their borders. Only in three places<\/strong> are the Chinese borders naturally permeable: at the Vietnamese frontier, via the Silk Road, and near Russian Far East. Hilly jungles separate China from Laos and Burma, the Himalayas shield it from the Indian subcontinent, almost impassable deserts divide it from Central Asia and the forbidding expanses of Siberia have never appealed to Chinese expansionism (until now, as the Russians fear).<\/em><\/p>\n

\tWith the exception of the Ming dynasty\u2019s sponsorship of admiral Zheng He\u2019s naval expeditions (as far away as Sri Lanka, Arabia and Africa) in the early 15th century, China has never attempted to be a naval-based power<\/strong> \u2013 so for most of its history, China\u2019s ports on the Pacific were hardly windows on the world either.<\/em><\/p>\n

\tChina\u2019s relative isolation, combined with the size of its population (1 in every 5 humans is Chinese), means China is virtually impossible to subdue militarily (as the Japanese discovered to their disadvantage in the 1930s). It also means China can \u2013 and often has \u2013 turned its back on the world, existing in splendid isolation<\/strong>.<\/em><\/p>\n

\tIts size and its penchand for autarkism dictate China\u2019s three main geopolitical objectives<\/strong>:<\/em><\/p>\n