Unter den Enthüllungen aus „Cablegate“, die wir bisher einsehen können – Wikileaks stellt die diplomatischen Kabelberichte nur Stück für Stück online – gehören die Einschätzungen über die Türkei sicher zu den aufregendsten. Richtig klasse geschrieben ist zum Beispiel dieser geheime Bericht des seinerzeitigen Botschafters Eric Edelman aus Ankara von Ende 2004. Darin finden sich sehr freimütige Einschätzungen des Premierministers Erdogan, des damaligen Außenminister Gül, der Chancen der Türkei auf einen EU-Beitritt, des islamistischen Einflusses auf die AKP, der Lage des Islams in der Türkei und allgemeiner Hindernisse der Türkei auf dem Weg in den Westen.
...Erdogan's hunger for power reveals itself in a sharp authoritarian style and deep distrust of others: as a former spiritual advisor to Erdogan and his wife Emine put it, "Tayyip Bey believes in God...but doesn't trust him." In surrounding himself with an iron ring of sycophantic (but contemptuous) advisors, Erdogan has isolated himself from a flow of reliable information, which partially explains his failure to understand the context -- or real facts -- of the U.S. operations in Tel Afar, Fallujah, and elsewhere and his susceptibility to Islamist theories. With regard to Islamist influences on Erdogan, DefMin Gonul, who is a conservative but worldly Muslim, recently described Gul associate Davutoglu to us as "exceptionally dangerous." Erdogan's other foreign policy advisors (Cuneyd Zapsu, Egemen Bagis, Omer Celik, along with Mucahit Arslan and chef de cabinet Hikmet Bulduk) are despised as inadequate, out of touch and corrupt by all our AKP contacts from ministers to MPs and party intellectuals. ...
Two Big Questions ----------------- ¶24. (C) Turkey's EU bid has brought forth reams of pronouncements and articles -- Mustafa Akyol's Gulenist-tinged "Thanksgiving for Turkey" in Dec. 27 Weekly Standard is one of the latest -- attempting to portray Islam in Turkey as distinctively moderate and tolerant with a strong mystical (Sufi) underpinning. Certainly, one can see in Turkey's theology faculties some attempts to wrestle with the problems of critical thinking, free will, and precedent (ictihad), attempts which, compared to what goes on in theology faculties in the Arab world, may appear relatively progressive. ¶25. (C) However, the broad, rubber-meets-the-road reality is that Islam in Turkey is caught in a vise of (1) 100 years of "secular" pressure to hide itself from public view, (2) pressure and competition from brotherhoods and lodges to follow their narrow, occult "true way", and (3) the faction- and positivism-ridden aridity of the Religious Affairs Directorate (Diyanet). As a result, Islam as it is lived in Turkey is stultified, riddled with hypocrisy, ignorant and intolerant of other religions' presence in Turkey, and unable to eject those who would politicize it in a radical, anti-Western way. Imams are for the most part poorly educated and all too ready to insinuate anti-Western, anti-Christian or anti-Jewish sentiments into their sermons. Exceptionally few Muslims in Turkey have the courage to challenge conventional Sunni thinking about jihad or, e.g., verses in the Repentance shura of the Koran which have for so long been used to justify violence against "infidels". ¶26. (C) The problem is compounded by the willingness of politicians such as Gul to play elusively with politicized Islam. Until Turkey ensures that the humanist strain in Islam prevails here, Islam in Turkey will remain a troubled, defensive force, hypocritical to an extreme degree and unwilling to adapt to the challenges of open society. ¶27. (C) A second question is the relation of Turkey and its citizens to history -- the history of this land and citizens' individual history. Subject to rigid taboos, denial, fears, and mandatory gross distortions, the study of history and practice of historiography in the Republic of Turkey remind one of an old Soviet academic joke: the faculty party chief assembles his party cadres and, warning against various ideological threats, proclaims, "The future is certain. It's only that damned past that keeps changing." ¶28. (C) Until Turkey can reconcile itself to its past, including the troubling aspects of its Ottoman past, in free and open debate, how will Turkey reconcile itself to the concept and practice of reconciliation in the EU? How will it have the self confidence to take decisions and formulate policies responsive to U.S. interests? Some in AKP are joining what is still only a handful of others to take tentative, but nonetheless inspiring, steps in this regard. However, the road ahead will require a massive overhaul of education, the introduction and acceptance of rule of law, and a fundamental redefinition of the relation between citizen and state. In the words of the great (Alevi) Anatolian bard Asik Veysel, this is a "long and delicate road."
Es ist faszinierend, solche Dokumente einsehen zu können. Aber es wäre naiv, sie als Stenographie des Weltgeistes zu lesen. Sie ergeben nicht einmal das Bild der USA von der Türkei. Man sieht, wie es auch hier auf den Autor und seinen Kontext ankommt. Edelman benennt freimütig viele reale Missstände – vor allem dieser letzte Absatz ist sicher auch heute noch hoch relevant.
Aber aus dem gesamten Kabel spricht eben auch der Gesandte George W. Bushs, ein gut verdrahteter Neocon, der der Türkei niemals verzeihen kann, dass sie sich dem Irakkrieg verweigert hat. Edelman wurde der erste wirklich verhasste Botschafter in der Türkei. Er wurde als eine Art Kolonialoffizier empfunden. Die Enttäuschung des Botschafters über den selbstbewusster werdenden Alliierten spricht aus dem Kabel und färbt offensichtlich die Analyse. Erdogan, der den Irakkrieg für einen Fehler hält, versteht eben einfach die Fakten nicht! Nun ja, das sieht man heute etwas anders. All das muss man mitbedenken, wenn man Edelmans Kabel liest. Man kann hier zum Zeugen eines wachsenden Entfremdung unter Partnern werden.