Lesezeichen
‹ Alle Einträge

Wikileaks: Erdogans „Machthunger“

 

Unter den Enthüllungen aus „Cablegate“, die wir bisher einsehen können – Wikileaks stellt die diplomatischen Kabelberichte nur Stück für Stück online – gehören die Einschätzungen über die Türkei sicher zu den aufregendsten. Richtig klasse geschrieben ist zum Beispiel dieser geheime Bericht des seinerzeitigen Botschafters Eric Edelman aus Ankara von Ende 2004. Darin finden sich sehr freimütige Einschätzungen des Premierministers Erdogan, des damaligen Außenminister Gül, der Chancen der Türkei auf einen EU-Beitritt, des islamistischen Einflusses auf die AKP, der Lage des Islams in der Türkei und allgemeiner Hindernisse der Türkei auf dem Weg in den Westen.

...Erdogan's hunger for power reveals
itself in a sharp authoritarian style and deep distrust of
others: as a former spiritual advisor to Erdogan and his wife
Emine put it, "Tayyip Bey believes in God...but doesn't trust
him."  In surrounding himself with an iron ring of
sycophantic (but contemptuous) advisors, Erdogan has isolated
himself from a flow of reliable information, which partially
explains his failure to understand the context -- or real
facts -- of the U.S. operations in Tel Afar, Fallujah, and
elsewhere and his susceptibility to Islamist theories.  With
regard to Islamist influences on Erdogan, DefMin Gonul, who
is a conservative but worldly Muslim, recently described Gul
associate Davutoglu to us as "exceptionally dangerous."
Erdogan's other foreign policy advisors (Cuneyd Zapsu, Egemen
Bagis, Omer Celik, along with Mucahit Arslan and chef de
cabinet Hikmet Bulduk) are despised as inadequate, out of
touch and corrupt by all our AKP contacts from ministers to
MPs and party intellectuals.
...
Two Big Questions

----------------- 

24. (C) Turkey's EU bid has brought forth reams of

pronouncements and articles -- Mustafa Akyol's

Gulenist-tinged "Thanksgiving for Turkey" in Dec. 27 Weekly

Standard is one of the latest -- attempting to portray Islam

in Turkey as distinctively moderate and tolerant with a

strong mystical (Sufi) underpinning.  Certainly, one can see

in Turkey's theology faculties some attempts to wrestle with

the problems of critical thinking, free will, and precedent

(ictihad), attempts which, compared to what goes on in

theology faculties in the Arab world, may appear relatively

progressive.

25. (C) However, the broad, rubber-meets-the-road reality is

that Islam in Turkey is caught in a vise of (1) 100 years of

"secular" pressure to hide itself from public view, (2)

pressure and competition from brotherhoods and lodges to

follow their narrow, occult "true way", and (3) the faction-

and positivism-ridden aridity of the Religious Affairs

Directorate (Diyanet).  As a result, Islam as it is lived in

Turkey is stultified, riddled with hypocrisy, ignorant and

intolerant of other religions' presence in Turkey, and unable

to eject those who would politicize it in a radical,

anti-Western way.  Imams are for the most part poorly

educated and all too ready to insinuate anti-Western,

anti-Christian or anti-Jewish sentiments into their sermons.

Exceptionally few Muslims in Turkey have the courage to

challenge conventional Sunni thinking about jihad or, e.g.,

verses in the Repentance shura of the Koran which have for so

long been used to justify violence against "infidels". 

26. (C) The problem is compounded by the willingness of

politicians such as Gul to play elusively with politicized

Islam.  Until Turkey ensures that the humanist strain in

Islam prevails here, Islam in Turkey will remain a troubled,

defensive force, hypocritical to an extreme degree and

unwilling to adapt to the challenges of open society. 

27. (C) A second question is the relation of Turkey and its

citizens to history -- the history of this land and citizens'

individual history.  Subject to rigid taboos, denial, fears,

and mandatory gross distortions, the study of history and

practice of historiography in the Republic of Turkey remind

one of an old Soviet academic joke: the faculty party chief

assembles his party cadres and, warning against various

ideological threats, proclaims, "The future is certain.  It's

only that damned past that keeps changing." 

28. (C) Until Turkey can reconcile itself to its past,

including the troubling aspects of its Ottoman past, in free

and open debate, how will Turkey reconcile itself to the

concept and practice of reconciliation in the EU?  How will

it have the self confidence to take decisions and formulate

policies responsive to U.S. interests?  Some in AKP are

joining what is still only a handful of others to take

tentative, but nonetheless inspiring, steps in this regard.

However, the road ahead will require a massive overhaul of

education, the introduction and acceptance of rule of law,

and a fundamental redefinition of the relation between

citizen and state.  In the words of the great (Alevi)

Anatolian bard Asik Veysel, this is a "long and delicate

road."

Es ist faszinierend, solche Dokumente einsehen zu können. Aber es wäre naiv, sie als Stenographie des Weltgeistes zu lesen. Sie ergeben nicht einmal das Bild der USA von der Türkei. Man sieht, wie es auch hier auf den Autor und seinen Kontext ankommt. Edelman benennt freimütig viele reale Missstände – vor allem dieser letzte Absatz ist sicher auch heute noch hoch relevant.

Aber aus dem gesamten Kabel spricht eben auch der Gesandte George W. Bushs, ein gut verdrahteter Neocon, der der Türkei niemals verzeihen kann, dass sie sich dem Irakkrieg verweigert hat. Edelman wurde der erste wirklich verhasste Botschafter in der Türkei. Er wurde als eine Art Kolonialoffizier empfunden. Die Enttäuschung des Botschafters über den selbstbewusster werdenden Alliierten spricht aus dem Kabel und färbt offensichtlich die Analyse. Erdogan, der den Irakkrieg für einen Fehler hält, versteht eben einfach die Fakten nicht! Nun ja, das sieht man heute etwas anders. All das muss man mitbedenken, wenn man Edelmans Kabel liest. Man kann hier zum Zeugen eines wachsenden Entfremdung unter Partnern werden.