Ich fürchte, John Gray (Professor an der London School of Economics) hat recht, wenn er die geplanten amerikanischen Waffenverkäufe an die „moderaten“ arabischen Regime so kommentiert:
The era of liberal interventionism in international affairs is over.
Die USA haben die Demokratisierung des Nahen Ostens aufgegeben und kehren zu eben jenem „Realismus“ zurück, den sie zuvor für überholt erklärt haben.
John Gray Foto: LSE
Gray begrüßt dies ausdrücklich und zieht eine Schreckensbilanz des Irak-Abenteuers:
Der Staat Irak ist Geschichte, was nur noch im Weissen Haus und der Phantasiewelt der Grünen Zone Bagdads geleugnet werde.
Die USA können aus dem Irak nicht einfach verschwinden wie aus Vietnam, weil Irak nicht an der Peripherie der Weltökonomie liegt und weil es keine funktionierende Regierung wie seinerzeit in Nordvietnam gibt, die übernehmen könnte. Sie bleiben gebunden in den Krieg um die Ressourcen und um die damit verbundene strategische Bedeutung des Landes und seiner Nachbarn.
Dies hier ist der finsterste Teil seiner Bilanz:
„The most important – as well as most often neglected – feature of the conflict shaping up around Iraq is that the US no longer has the ability to mould events. Whatever it does, there will be decades of bloodshed in the region. Another large blunder – such as bombing Iran, as Dick Cheney seems to want, or launching military operations against Pakistan, as some in Washington appear to propose – would make matters even worse.
The chaos that has engulfed Iraq is only the start of a longer and larger upheaval, but it would be useful if we learned a few lessons from it. There is a stupefying cliche which says regime change went wrong because there was not enough thought about what to do after the invasion. The truth is that if there had been sufficient forethought the invasion would not have been launched. After the overthrow of Saddam – a secular despot in a European tradition that includes Lenin and Stalin – there was never any prospect of imposing a western type of government. Grotesque errors were made such as the disbanding of the Iraqi army, but they only accelerated a process of fragmentation that would have happened anyway. Forcible democratisation undid not only the regime but also the state.
Liberal interventionists who supported regime change as part of a global crusade for human rights overlooked the fact that the result of toppling tyranny in divided countries is usually civil war and ethnic cleansing. Equally they failed to perceive the rapidly dwindling leverage on events of the western powers that led the crusade. If anyone stands to gain long term it is Russia and China, which have stood patiently aside and now watch the upheaval with quiet satisfaction. Neoconservatives spurned stability in international relations and preached the virtues of creative destruction. Liberal internationalists declared history had entered a new stage in which pre-emptive war would be used to construct a new world order where democracy and peace thrived. The result of these delusions is what we see today: a world of rising authoritarian regimes and collapsed states no one knows how to govern.“