Fareed Zakaria, Chefredakteur der internationalen Ausgabe von Newsweek, sammelt die Argumente gegen die herrschende Meinung, dass der Iran sich in den Besitz der Atombombe zu bringen versuche.
Er zitiert die Stimmen dess Regimes, die Atomwaffen als „unislamisch“ gebrandmarkt haben – darunter Ahmadinedschad, Khamenei und Khomeini:
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has quoted the regime’s founding father, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who asserted that such weapons were „un-Islamic.“ The country’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued a fatwa in 2004 describing the use of nuclear weapons as immoral. In a subsequent sermon, he declared that „developing, producing or stockpiling nuclear weapons is forbidden under Islam.“ Last year Khamenei reiterated all these points after meeting with the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei. Now, of course, they could all be lying. But it seems odd for a regime that derives its legitimacy from its fidelity to Islam to declare constantly that these weapons are un-Islamic if it intends to develop them. It would be far shrewder to stop reminding people of Khomeini’s statements and stop issuing new fatwas against nukes.
Dann bestreitet Zakaria die Deutung des islamischen Regimes in Iran als „apokalyptischer, messianischer Kult“ – eine Deutung, die vor allem in israelischen Regierungskreisen verbreitet ist. Die Iraner sind keine Selbstmörder, schreibt er. Sie haben in den letzten Jahren auf eine geschickte, taktisch kluge Weise ihre Machtposition im Nahen Osten ausgebaut – unter großzügiger Hilfe von George Bush. Die islamische Republik sei weder eine Diktatur noch eine Demokratie. Iran könne man am besten als eine Oligarchie beschreiben – mit beträchtlichen Debatten innerhalb der herrschenden Elite.
Zakaria sieht eine mögliche Lösung des Streits in dem Konzept einer interational kontrollierten Urananreicherung auf iranischem Boden. Dem Iran würde damit möglich gemacht, am zivilen Atomprogramm festzuhalten. Der internationalen Gemeinschaft käme dieses Konzept entgegen, weil damit ständige Kontrollen einhergehen würden. (Das ist eine Variation von Steinmeiers Vorschlag aus dem Jahr 2007.)
Obamas Stabschef Mike Mullen allerdings widerspricht Zakarias Einschätzung, was die möglicherweise friedlichen Absichten des iranischen Programms angeht. Er glaubt, wie er ABC sagte, dass Iran die Bombe will. Eben darum beharrt er auf der Wichtigkeit der neuen diplomatischen Initiativen des amerikanischen Präsidenten.
MULLEN: Well, I believe then and I still believe that Iran’s strategic objective is to achieve nuclear weapons, and that that path continues. Their leadership is committed to it. They conducted a missile test this last week that was successful, which continues to improve their missile delivery system and capability. Their intent seems very clear to me, and I’m one who believes if they achieve that objective, that it is incredibly destabilizing for the region. And I think eventually for the world.
…
STEPHANOPOULOS: So you don’t believe it? That they don’t want nuclear weapons.
MULLEN: At this point no.
STEPHANOPOULOS: And the chief of staff to Israel’s defense minister, General Michael Herzog, has said that Iran could actually have its first nuclear weapon by the end of 2010 or the beginning of 2011. Do you agree with that?
MULLEN: Well, I think you make certain assumptions about what they can do. Most of us believe that it’s one to three years, depending on assumptions about where they are right now. But they are moving closer, clearly, and they continue to do that. And if you believe their strategic intent, as I do, and as certainly my Israeli counterpart does, that’s the principle concern.
STEPHANOPOULOS: And you just said that you believe that a nuclear Iran would be calamitous for the region. But last year, Sy Hersh in the „New Yorker“ reported that you pushed back very hard against any notion of a military strike during President Bush’s administration. And you’ve spoken publicly about the unintended consequences of a military strike by Israel. So what worries you more? A nuclear Iran or war with Iran?
MULLEN: Well, they both worry me a lot. And I think the unintended consequences of a strike against Iran right now would be incredibly serious. As well as the unintended consequences of their achieving a nuclear weapon.
And so that’s why this engagement in dialogue is so important. I think we should do that with all options on the table. As we approach them.
And so that leaves a pretty narrow space in which to achieve a successful dialogue and a successful outcome, which from my perspective means they don’t end up with nuclear weapons.
STEPHANOPOULOS: They don’t end up with nuclear weapons, but could they have as Japan does a full nuclear fuel cycle program that’s fully inspected?
MULLEN: I think that’s certainly a possibility and this isn’t, at least, from my perspective, from the military perspective, this isn’t about them having the ability to produce nuclear power. It’s about their desire and their goal to have a nuclear weapon.
(Die kenntnisreichste Diskussion der theologischen Debatte um die Legitimität der „islamischen Bombe“ findet sich übrigens hier, in einem Text von Noah Feldman aus der NYT.)