Der kanadische Journalist Graeme Smith von der Zeitung Globe and Mail hat vor einem Jahr bereits getan, was nun westliche Regierungen erwägen: Mit den Taliban sprechen. Er drückte einem afghanischen Reporter mit Nähe zu den Aufständischen eine Kamera in die Hand und gab ihm eine Liste von Fragen mit – und so entstanden 42 Video-Interviews mit durchschnittlichen Taliban-Kämpfern.

Sie sind alle im Original mit englischen Untertitel auf der Website des Globe abzurufen. Es bietet sich ein ernüchterndes Bild einer Gruppe von entschlossenen Kämpfern, die gegen die „Nichtmuslime“ aufstehen, die ihr Land besetzt haben – ohne die leiseste Idee von diesen Besatzern und ihren Heimatländern. (Nicht einmal „Nato“ sagt den meisten etwas.)  Sie wollen einen islamischen Staat in Afghanistan. Sie sind keine globalen Dschihadisten, die ihren Kampf weiter tragen wollen als über ihren Lebensraum. Viele von ihnen sind in den Drogenanbau verwickelt, ein Drittel ist betroffen (oder behauptet dies) von Militäraktionen der multinationalen Kräfte, die man rächen will. Selbstmordaktionen, die einst noch skeptisch gesehen wurden (weil sie keine ehrenwerte Form des Kampfes seien), werden heute von den meisten bejaht. 

Auszug aus der Website: 

The typical Taliban foot soldier battling Canadian troops and their allies in Kandahar is not a global jihadist who dreams of some day waging war on Canadian soil. In fact, he would have trouble finding Canada on a map.

Screenshot: JL

A survey of 42 insurgents in Kandahar province posed a series of questions about the fighters‘ view of the world, and the results contradicted the oft-repeated perception of the Taliban as sophisticated terrorists who pose a direct threat to Western countries.

Faced with a multiple-choice question about Canada’s location, only one of 42 fighters correctly guessed that Canada is located to the north of the United States, meaning the insurgents performed worse than randomly.

None of them could identify Stephen Harper as the Prime Minister of Canada, and they often repeated the syllables of his name — „Stepheh Napper,“ „Sehn Hahn,“ „Steng Peng Beng,“ „Gra Pla Pla“ — that reflected their puzzlement over a name they had never heard.

Nor did they seem to associate the word „Canada“ with anything except, in some cases, the soldiers now serving in Afghanistan. Most could not distinguish between the French- and English-speaking rotations of troops.

…

The results show the depth of ignorance among front-line insurgents in Kandahar. In a previous visit to the tribal areas of Pakistan, a reporter for The Globe and Mail personally met with more sophisticated Taliban who demonstrated a keen grasp of politics and appeared to know the latest news of the war. But those politically astute Taliban were hundreds of kilometres away from the battlefields, and it remains unclear how much control such organizers exert over the day-to-day operations of the insurgency.

The Taliban became synonymous with ignorance during their years in government, banning media such as television that might bring foreign ideas into the country. As insurgents, however, they’ve shown a newfound flair for technology, distributing video propaganda and sending press statements via text message to reporters‘ mobile phones.

…

„Those [insurgents] making decisions are more sophisticated than those you are interviewing, so there is some chance of this being plausible,“ the expert said. „But I think they’re working to their own calendar, not ours.“ Three fighters in the survey didn’t recognize the name of U.S. President George W. Bush, and another mispronounced his name as „Bukh,“ suggesting he wasn’t familiar with the word.

Those who had heard of the U.S. President often gave responses that revealed more of their parochialism. He was called a „Jew,“ and „King of America.“ Sometimes, amid the errors, the Taliban showed their simplistic view of world politics.

„He is the son of George W, [and] he is the son of Clinton W, and he is American, and is a serious enemy of Islam,“ said one fighter in his description of Mr. Bush.

Also den Weg von der Terrororganisation, mit der man niemals sprechen darf, bis zum geschätzten Partner für den Frieden und die Zweistaatenlösung?

Jeffrey Goldberg ist mehr als skeptisch:

I would never predict that certain leaders of Hamas couldn’t evolve and leave the organization to form new, more pragmatic organizations. And I would not say that there are no differences among Hamas leaders; much of the Gaza leadership is tactically more pragmatic than the Damascus leaders. But I believe that jihadist organizations are jihadist at their core, and that it is theologically impossible for Hamas to change. The PLO was never bound by these strictures. I think the more relevant question might be: Will Israel wind up negotiating with Hamas, as it once negotiated with the PLO? This, of course, is a possibility. By the nature of Hamas, of course, I don’t see much success for that route, either.

Mehr hier.

Eine neue Studie (für das Marine Corps) beschreibt, was zu beachten ist, wenn man die Lektionen aus dem Irak auf Afghanistan übertragen will. Entscheidend sind Politik und Diplomatie, schreiben die Autoren. Die schlechte Regierungsführung in Afghanistan schafft große Unzufriedenheit und  treibt den Aufständischen Unterstützung zu. Beim Reden und Verhandeln mit den Stammesführern sind aber deutliche Unterschiede zwischen Afghanistan und al-Anbar im Irak zu sehen. Eine essentielle Studie. Auszüge aus der Konklusion: 

In summary, counterinsurgency in Afghanistan will be different from counterinsurgency in Al Anbar. Any “solution” to the Afghan insurgency must address not sectarianism or a civil war but government misrule tied to a history of warlordism—strategic factors that define the problem. Without reducing the abusive behavior of the government and their warlordclients, it is hard to see how security measures will have a long-lasting effect. Security will not stop mistreatment at the hands of government officials or the continued predatory behavior of warlords.

Another strategic factor that cannot be avoided is the large safe haven in Pakistan’s tribal areas, where insurgents can readily train, recuperate, and organize; a permanent bastion. Given time, US forces may be able to pacify some parts of Afghanistan, perhaps even the bulk of the population. Nevertheless, until the policies of the Pakistani military change, the insurgents should be able to regenerate in the tribal areas. From there, they will be able to try again and again at breaking into pacified areas. Poppy does not help. Funds from its production and trade enhance the ability of the insurgents to keep going. In the end, their attempts may go nowhere but they will have the wherewithal to go round after round, fighting season after fighting season.

Other differences between Al Anbar and Afghanistan may not be strategic but will affect operations, most notably tribal engagement efforts. Tribal engagement, to include the development of tribal forces, will need to be built around the fragmented nature of the tribal system, the feuding of Pashtunwali, and the opportunism of warlords. Patience and forethought in the planning and execution of tribal engagement efforts are advised. Smallscale community successes are more likely than large-scale province-wide successes. Gaining the support of as many tribal elders as possible and using the shura system are likely to be necessary steps in any effort. Locally recruited forces—whether police or some kind of neighborhood watch—will only be as strong as the shura behind them.

Finally, the differences between Al Anbar and Afghanistan will affect tactics. A rural environment, the tactical skill of the insurgency, and Pashtunwali compel a re-thinking of the tactics of counterinsurgency. How Marines and Soldiers outpost, patrol, re-supply, collect bottom-up intelligence, and many other tactics—not to mention logistics—will have to adjust to a rural environment where the population is spread out over wide distances and to an insurgency skilled at small-unit tactics. The usefulness of certain other tactics deserves reconsideration, most notably cordon and searches, air strikes, and population control measures. Because of Pashtunwali, their costs may be greater than their benefits.

In spite of all these differences, Al Anbar and Afghanistan have some similarities. In addition to government misrule, Afghan insurgents also fight because of the presence of US (and allied) forces—infidels—in their country and, in some cases, because they want to see the establishment of an Islamic government.24 The same could be said of insurgents in Al Anbar.

Accordingly, the emphasis that was placed on giving Iraqis a lead role in counterinsurgency operations in Al Anbar will need to be replicated for Afghans in Afghanistan (even if we must at the same time try to empower the right leaders and guide them toward good governance). To give other examples, tribes are important political players in both regions,underlining the wisdom of tribal engagement of some kind; while advising indigenous forces and clear, hold, and build efforts have proven as effective in Afghanistan as Al Anbar, though the tactical details of implementation differ. These similarities make clear that some fundamentals of counterinsurgency remain the same even though strategy as a whole may need to be re-shaped around the unique characteristics of Afghanistan.

Diese Dokumentation ist einfach erschütternd. Der letzte Tag einer Mädchenschule im Swat-Tal, bevor die Taliban sie dichtmachen. Ein Lehrer und seine Tochter erzählen.

Ein Vortrag, gehalten in der evangelischen Friedensgemeinde Charlottenburg, gestern am 13. März 2009:

In der Nacht des 4. November fuhr ich mit dem Fahrrad nach Hause. Wir hatten den Wahlabend, an dem der erste schwarze Präsident Amerikas gewählt worden war, im „Center for European Studies“ der Harvard-Universität in Cambridge verbracht. Man hatte bei Wein und Käsehäppchen dem Moment der Wahrheit eitgegengefiebert – nach Monaten eines Nerven zerfetzenden Wahlkampfs. Auf einer Großbildleinwand hatte das gesamte Institut zusammen die historische Nacht verfolgt. Dann kam endlich die Erlösung: Der Sender MSNBC erklärte Obama als erster zum Sieger. Die anderen Sender folgten bald nach.

Auf dem etwa 12 Kilometer langen weg von Cambridge nach Südboston, wo ich wohnte, sah ich Szenen, die ich so noch nie in Amerika erlebt habe: Spontane Autokorsos hatten sich gebildet und fuhren laut hupend über die Brücken des Charles River. Trotz klirrender Kälte waren überall Menschen auf den Straßen um zu feiern. Auf dem Universitätscampus fand sich spontan eine Blaskapelle begeisterter Studenten zusammen, die die Nationalhymne anstimmten – das Star Spangled Banner. Immer wieder kamen mir Passanten entgegen, die mich einfach beseelt anlächelten. Es war, als wäre eine tonnenschwere Last von den Menschen abgefallen. Die ganze Stimmung erinnerte an den Fall der Berliner Mauer. Etwas Neues konnte endlich beginnen.

Das war das eine. Doch in den Wochen meines USA-Aufenthaltes kam auch etwas an sein Ende: Jahrzehnte einer beispiellosen ökonomischen Expansion, die von Amerika aus angetrieben wurde, von der wir aber alle profitiert haben.

Ja, der Boom, der seit den Reagan-Jahren die gesamte Welt erfaßt hat, war alles in allem eine gute Zeit – nicht nur für den Westen. In der früher so genannten Dritten Welt konnte eine Mittelklasse aufsteigen, die erstmals Zugang zu Bildung, bescheidenem Reichtum und schließlich auch zu politischer Teilnahme bekam. Vielen Millionen Menschen gelang es, aus Hunger und Subsistenzwirtschaft zu entkommen und ein menschenwürdigeres Leben zu führen. Und hier bei uns in Europa erledigte sich durch den Höhenflug des westlichen Kapitalismus die Systemfrage des Kalten Krieges. Der Kommunismus implodierte – nicht zuletzt, weil er seinen Bürgern keine Lebenschancen bieten konnte wie das Konkurrenzsystem. All das muss man im Blick behalten, wenn man jetzt auf den bösen Kapitalismus zurückschaut aus der Perspektive unserer heutigen Krise. Weiter„Wie Amerika sich in der Krise verändert“

Der von mir hier vorgestellte Artikel von Fareed Zakaria wird in der englischsprachigen arabischen Presse stark diskutiert. Und vor allem negativ: Sowohl in Al-Hayat wie in Asharq Alawsat (beide saudisch finanziert) trifft die Idee Zakarias auf entschiedene, geradezu wütende Ablehnung.

Raghida Dergham, die diplomatische Korrespondentin von Al-Hayat, sorgt sich, dass möglich zukünftige Deals zwischen der US-Regierung und radikalen Islamisten  auf Kosten der moderaten und säkularen Kräfte im Nahen Osten gehen würden:

Zakaria quotes former CIA analyst Reuel Marc Gerecht saying that „it’s hard to hand over authority to people who are illiberal. What you have to realize is that the objective is to defeat bin Ladenism, and you have to start the evolution. Moderate Muslims are not the answer. Shiite clerics and Sunni fundamentalists are our salvation from future 9/11s“. These are dangerous words, not because they exclude and downgrade moderates while strengthening fundamentalists, but because they focus, with the utmost selfishness, on 9/11 from the perspective of the war on terror, instead of thinking of the consequences of excluding moderation and adopting partnership with fundamentalism. Perhaps the idea behind the cover of Newsweek is to appreciate the local cultural context and respect the fact that people seek to find a balance between freedom and order, as Zakaria says, as radical Islam is destined to lose in Muslim countries because its charms wear out once put to practice. Perhaps it is useful to leave Muslims to clash with the civilized world on their own so that they may realize that they have no choice but to abandon fundamentalism or extremist radicalism.

Raghida Dergham   Foto: RaghidaDergham.com

However, it is important not to leave the impression that the West is willing to strike deals with radical Islam or with the sponsors of armed militias from the coalition of extremism and defiance, without regard for the harm this would inflict on moderation and moderates. Things are not as they used to be, and there are opposition movements in Arab countries that side with the government and its security apparatus when they only have one other choice, that of radical Islam. We must be wary not to repeat the painful mistakes of the past.

Noch härter geht der saudische Journalist Mshari Al-Zaydi mit „Fareeds schlechter Idee“ ins Gericht: 

„Nach einer Attacke auf alle islamistischen Bewegungen unter Bush, selbst auf die weniger extremen unter ihnen, werden wir nun mit einer feigen Koexistenz-Angebot gegenüber den Taliban und ihresgeleichen in nigeria, Algerien und Irak konfrontiert.“ 

Al-Zaydi empört sich darüber, dass Zakaria offenbar die schlimmsten Gruppen tolerieren und gat als Partner kooptieren wolle, sofern sie nur die eigenen Gesellschaften ihrem barabarischen Regime unterwerfen wollen und den Westen in Ruhe lassen.

Dies sei falsches Denken, wie ja eben der Fall der Taliban gezeigt habe, die Al-Kaida aufgenommen hätten. 

One might understand the idea of engaging in practical dialogue with a group of fighters as a way to dissuade them from harming an occupying force, just like what happened in Iraq and what will happen, or is happening, in Afghanistan. The motive would be to establish more security, weaken the enemy and decrease its support. But what is difficult to understand is this mistaken idea suggested by intellectuals in the US such as Fareed Zakaria, which gives the impression that the Islamic world is nothing but a laboratory where tests can be carried out.

Mshari Al-Zaydi   Foto: Asharq Alawsat

Firstly, it is not true that fanatics who limit fanaticism to their own societies are not harmful to the outside world. Who provided support to Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan? Who oppressed women, outlawed arts and turned Afghanistan into a society that apart from being plagued by poverty and war suffers from the hell of fanaticism? Should they be left to kill the spirit of life and is this not a concern for the US? If we apply this to a country like Yemen for example and let those fanatics loose based on the pretext that they only want to enforce their fanaticism within the borders of their own countries, the result would be that we have provided the ideal atmosphere for elements of Al Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Egyptian Al Gamaa al Islamiya and groups in Algeria, Libya and Morocco to operate and conceal themselves in an ocean of religious extremism in a society that has been left to its own devices simply because its extremism only concerns that society.

This is a cowardly and an opportunist theory, which is also impractical. It could be understood within the context of exhaustion as a result of confrontation with fanatics. However, it is definitely not an acceptable or good idea. Fanatics were left to their own devices in a number of Arab and Gulf countries for too long and the result was catastrophic. We have begun to see the fruits of their fanaticism in all aspects of life by their silencing of others, outlawing arts, science and communication with the outside world as well as battling ferociously against civilization, and state and social development.

p.s.: Und noch ein wütend ablehnender Kommentar zu Zakaria’s Ideen und Obamas Gesprächsangebot n die Radikalen, von Elias Harfoush in Al-Hayat:

There is no more obvious proof of the failure of any attempt to lure moderates from Taliban to a political settlement than what the Zardari government in Pakistan did recently. The Pakistani regime released the hands of the Pakistani branch of Taliban, as it believed that they can be dealt with, in an attempt to regain control of the Swat province. But what was the result? More murders and torture of those opposed to the movement and more suffering for the people who returned after the truce on the assumptions that stability was restored. More decapitated bodies of singers and artists and people whom the Taliban accuse of doing „indecent“ activities, more attacks on female school teachers, including throwing acid at their faces on their way to work or threatening them with murder if they persist in their professions. As a result, many schools had to close down, while the whole Pakistani province relived the worst days of Taliban rule in Afghanistan before September 11 and the American invasion.

As for how these organizations perceive the West’s new approach towards them, it also highlights the lack of understanding that the West has of these Islamic movements as it classifies them into „moderate,“ „radical,“ while referring to their solid ideology as „military and political wings.“ In the eyes of these movements, their actions and ideas are completely correct. Hence, they view the West’s openness as a „defeat“ for the western forces that are now seeking dialogue.

This is why the leaders of Hezbollah interpreted the British move as a „correction“ of the past British policy. It is no secret that the leaders of Hamas mock the division of the movement into „wings“ in Damascus and Gaza, while everyone knows from where the decisions come and at the service of whom. The same happened with the Taliban leaders who responded to Obama’s attempt to lure the „moderates“ by urging him to declare his defeat in Afghanistan and to withdraw.

If political decisions are built more on wishes than on facts on the ground, they will often backfire. 

Eine sehr ungewöhnliche Koalition von prominenten Intellektuellen hat sich in einem Offenen Brief an Präsident Obama gewandt. Islamwissenschaftler wie John Esposito, Neocons und Ex-Neocons wie Jean Bethke Elshtain, Robert Kagan und Francis Fukuyama, demokratische Muslime wie Radwan Masmoudi und Saad Eddin Ibrahim, linke Falken wie Peter Beinart und Matt Yglesias, der ehemalige Malysische Minsterpräsident Anwar Ibrahim und viele weitere unterstützen die Initiative. 

Das Ziel: Obama soll bei seiner neorealistischen Wende nicht aus den Augen verlieren, dass Demokratie und Menschenrechte im Nahen Osten und in der weiteren islamischen Welt auf der Tagesordnung bleiben müssen.

Man kann in dem Brief vielleicht eine Mahnung sehen, bei all den lobenswerten Initiativen, nun auch mit Schurken zu reden, nicht zu vergessen, dass das schlechte Standing der USA und des Westens in der Region auch daher kommt, dass man sich jahrzehntelang mit den Unterdrückern gemein gemacht hat, die Menschenrechte unterdrücken, foltern und Regimegegner einsperren.

Die Autoren plädieren auch für die Zusammenarbeit mit „mainstream islamist parties“, sofern sie durch Wahlen an die Macht gekommen sind, auf Gewalt verzichten und den demokratischen Prozess bejahen (Bsp. Türkei, Indonesien, Marokko). Demokratie ist nicht teilbar.  

Also: Gegen die autokratischen Regime aufstehen, wo sie Menschenrechte mißachten, und furchtlos den demokratischen Prozess auch dann verteidigen, wenn er Islamisten an die Macht bringt.

Hier der ganze Brief. 

Auszug:

In his second inaugural address, President Bush pledged that the United States would no longer support tyrants and would stand with those activists and reformers fighting for democratic change. The Bush administration, however, quickly turned its back on Middle East democracy after Islamist parties performed well in elections throughout the region. This not only hurt the credibility of the United States, dismayed democrats and emboldened extremists in the region, but also sent a powerful message to autocrats that they could reassert their power and crush the opposition with impunity.

In order to rebuild relations of mutual respect, it is critical that the United States be on the right side of history regarding the human, civil, and political rights of the peoples of the Middle East. There is no doubt that the people of the Middle East long for greater freedom and democracy; they have proven themselves willing to fight for it. What they need from your administration is a commitment to encourage political reform not through wars, threats, or imposition, but through peaceful policies that reward governments that take active and measurable steps towards genuine democratic reforms. Moreover, the US should not hesitate to speak out in condemnation when opposition activists are unjustly imprisoned in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, or elsewhere. When necessary, the United States should use its considerable economic and diplomatic leverage to put pressure on its allies in the region when they fail to meet basic standards of human rights.

David Rothkopf hat auf seinem Foreign-Policy-Blog eine kleine Hilfestellung für CIA-Männer im Einsatz zusammengestellt, die nun in den Bergen des Hindukusch den „moderaten Taliban“ suchen gehen:

The man you are looking for will display one or more of the following views:

1) Seeks only partial destruction of the United States

2) Advocates stoning unfaithful women to death with only small rocks and pebbles

3) Believes terrorists are rewarded in heaven with only 25 virgins

4) Offers Bin Laden refuge in his home only during inclement weather

5) Still seeks to march every last Israeli into the sea but promises not to gloat about it afterwards

This gentleman will probably have a somewhat shorter beard than is typical, smiles occasionally, speaks some English and was last reported living with the Tooth Fairy in Candyland.“

Der Wirtschaftshistoriker Niall Ferguson sieht alle drei Hauptgründe für den Ausbruch politischer Gewalt in Weltkriegsdimension erfüllt: Ethnischer Zerfall, ökonomische Unsicherheit und der Zerfall eines Weltreichs. Die Ressourcen des Weltpolizisten USA für seine immer größeren Aufgaben werden rapide schwinden.

I concluded, in The War of the World, that three factors made the location and timing of lethal organized violence more or less predictable in the last century. The first factor was ethnic disintegration: Violence was worst in areas of mounting ethnic tension. The second factor was economic volatility: The greater the magnitude of economic shocks, the more likely conflict was. And the third factor was empires in decline: When structures of imperial rule crumbled, battles for political power were most bloody.

…

With the U.S. rate of GDP growth set to contract between 2 and 3 percentage points this year, and with the official unemployment rate likely to approach 10 percent, all attention in Washington will remain focused on a nearly $1 trillion stimulus package. Caution has been thrown to the wind by both the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. The projected deficit for 2009 is already soaring above the trillion-dollar mark, more than 8 percent of GDP. Few commentators are asking what all this means for U.S. foreign policy.

The answer is obvious: The resources available for policing the world are certain to be reduced for the foreseeable future. That will be especially true if foreign investors start demanding higher yields on the bonds they buy from the United States or simply begin dumping dollars in exchange for other currencies.

Economic volatility, plus ethnic disintegration, plus an empire in decline: That combination is about the most lethal in geopolitics. We now have all three. The age of upheaval starts now.

Roger Cohen ist dafür:

Of course it’s desirable that Hamas recognize Israel before negotiations. But is it essential? No. What is essential is that it renounces violence, in tandem with Israel, and the inculcation of hatred that feeds the violence.

Speaking of violence, it’s worth recalling what Israel did in Gaza in response to sporadic Hamas rockets. It killed upward of 1,300 people, many of them women and children; caused damage estimated at $1.9 billion; and destroyed thousands of Gaza homes. It continues a radicalizing blockade on 1.5 million people squeezed into a narrow strip of land.

At this vast human, material and moral price, Israel achieved almost nothing beyond damage to its image throughout the world. Israel has the right to hit back when attacked, but any response should be proportional and governed by sober political calculation. The Gaza war was a travesty; I have never previously felt so shamed by Israel’s actions.

No wonder Hamas and Hezbollah are seen throughout the Arab world as legitimate resistance movements.

It’s time to look at them again and adopt the new British view that contact can encourage Hezbollah “to move away from violence and play a constructive, democratic and peaceful role.”

The British step is a breakthrough.

Die Briten hatten nämlich angekündigt, mit dem politischen Arm der Hisbollah reden zu wollen. Jahrelang hatte man dies verweigert – mit der Begründung, Hisbollah sei eine Terrororganisation und sonst nichts. Nun versucht man zwischen der politischen Bewegung (die Teil der libanesischen Regieurng ist) und der Terrorgruppe zu unterscheiden. Überall der gleiche Versuch – bei den Taliban, bei Hamas, beim Iran und bei Hisbollah – die rationalen Elemente von den fanatischen zu unterscheiden und die feinen Risse auszunutzen, um die Bewegungen zu spalten. Richtig so: Das ist nichts als die Wiederkehr der Politik, so lange wir uns dabei keinen Illusionen hingeben. 

Für den Fall Iran würde dieser Neuansatz bedeuten: Wir geben die Strategie „regime change“ auf und drängen nur noch auf Verhaltensänderung.