Aus Haaretz:

Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni said a few months ago in a series of closed discussions that in her opinion that Iranian nuclear weapons do not pose an existential threat to Israel, Haaretz magazine reveals in an article on Livni to be published tomorrow.

Livni also criticized the exaggerated use that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is making of the issue of the Iranian bomb, claiming that he is attempting to rally the public around him by playing on its most basic fears. Last week, former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy said similar things about Iran.

Unglaublich: Ab Sekunde 48 hört man laut und deutlich, wie die iranischen Studenten „marg bar dictator“ rufen – Tod dem Diktator, und dies vor den Toren der Teheraner Universität, wo Präsident Achmadinedschad gerade einen Vortrag hält.
Was wird wohl aus ihnen werden?

„Ahmadinejad under high security gave a speech in closed doors to selected supporters while students of Tehran University were blocked from entering the auditorium.

Some of the Iranian students slogans and posters were:

„Death to Dictator“, „Free imprisoned students“, „We have questions too, Why only Columbia?“ , „Here is Columbia too“, „In Columbia yes, in Tehran no?“, „Mahmoud Ahmadinejad source of poverty and corruption“, „Freedom is our definite right“, „Fashist government should be destroyed“, „Shame on the regime leave the university“, „student torture is condemned“. „we don’t want dictator regime, we don’t want mercenary police“, „political prisoners must be freed“, „shame on police, leave the university“, „Fashist president, university is not your place“

Ahamdinejad’s motorcade left the university while the police tried to disperse the students with tear gas. The university were surrounded and blocked with police buses to prevent the outside public from joining the demonstrations. Many cameras were forcefully confiscated.

Wunderbare Persiflage von SNL auf den New-York-Besuch des iranischen Präsidenten:

Und irgendwie scheint mir dieses kuriose Video über iranische Aerobics dazu zu passen. Guter Musik-Track:

Ein Comicbuch der 50er Jahre mit aktuellem Bezug. Dank an iranian.com.

Israels bekanntester Militärhistoriker Martin van Creveld empfindet die Aufregung um das iranische Atomprogramm als Hysterie. In einem seiner berüchtigten, kalt analysierenden Artikel im jüdischen „Forward“ geht er der iranischen Stärke nach:

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad looks and sounds as if he is in a panic — and the Iranian president, on tour in New York this week, has very good reason to be.

Israel, which Ahmadinejad regards as his country’s great enemy, has just carried out what seems to be a very successful strike against an important Syrian installation. And behind Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stands President Bush — the same President Bush who four years ago needed no reason at all to take on Iran’s neighbor to the west and demolish it to the point where it may never rise again.

Both Olmert and Bush have repeatedly signaled their determination to prevent Iran from going nuclear, using force if necessary, and they may very well carry out their threats. Should they do so, then Iran — so often presented as some kind of regional juggernaut — will have little to put in their way.

Though rich in oil, Iran is a third-world country with a population of 80 million and a per capita income of $2,440. By the best available figures, those of the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies, its annual defense budget stands at about $6.3 billion — a little more than half of Israel’s and a little less than 2% of America’s.

Martin van Creveld von der Jerusalemer Hebrew University

Iran, in fact, spends a smaller percentage of its resources on defense than any of its neighbors except the United Arab Emirates. And while Iran might very well operate covert programs whose cost would bump up its total defense expenditures, the same can be said of many other countries.

Should the United States strike at Iran — and let’s be clear here, we are talking about a strike by cruise missiles and manned aircraft, not about an invasion for which Washington does not have the troops — then Tehran will have almost no way to hit back.

….

In case Bush does decide to attack Iran, it is questionable whether Iran’s large, well-dispersed and well-camouflaged nuclear program can really be knocked out. This is all the more doubtful because, in contrast to the Israeli attacks on Iraq back in 1981 and on Syria three weeks ago, the element of surprise will be lacking. And even if it can be done, whether doing so will serve a useful purpose is also questionable.

Since 1945 hardly one year has gone by in which some voices — mainly American ones concerned about preserving Washington’s monopoly over nuclear weapons to the greatest extent possible — did not decry the terrible consequences that would follow if additional countries went nuclear. So far, not one of those warnings has come true. To the contrary: in every place where nuclear weapons were introduced, large-scale wars between their owners have disappeared.

General John Abizaid, the former commander of United States Central Command, is only the latest in a long list of experts to argue that the world can live with a nuclear Iran. Their views deserve to be carefully considered, lest Ahmadinejad’s fear-driven posturing cause anybody to do something stupid.

Die Londoner Times vom Sonntag berichtet, eine Sondereinheit der Air Force habe im Pentagon damit begonnen, konkrete Pläne für einen Krieg gegen Iran zu kalkulieren. „Project Checkmate“ (Projekt Schachmatt) ist der passende Name dieser Einheit, die bereits die Luftangriffe für den ersten Krieg gegen Saddam Hussein geplant hatte. Sie wird geleitet von einem Air Force General mit dem schönen Namen Lawrence A. Stutzriem, der nicht von ungefähr an die Welt von Dr. Seltsam erinnert.

Brigadegeneral Lawrence Stutzriem, Leiter von „Checkmate“ Foto: Pentagon

Im Juni, sagen Pentagon-Quellen, sei die Einheit bereits im Stillen wieder zusammengerufen worden. Dass ihre Arbeit nun öffentlich gemacht wurde, darf man getrost als Teil der Propagandakrieges begreifen. Zusammen mit den Äußerungen des französischen Präsidenten („iranische Bombe oder Bombardierung Irans“) und seines Aussenministers, der letzte Woch erstmals von einem „Krieg“ gegen Iran sprach, ergibt sich das Bild einer gezielten Eskalation.

Wir starren in der diplomatischen Krise mit Iran zu viel auf Machmud Achmadinedschad. Der iranische Präsident, der gerade zur UN-Vollversammlung nach New York gereist ist, wurde daran gehindert, Ground Zero zu besuchen, und seine geplante Rede an der Columbia University hat schon vorab eine Protestwelle inspiriert.

Der Lauteste im Nahen Osten
In der NYT fühlt sich Michael Slackman gedrängt, die Überschätzung des iranischen Präsidenten mit einem Zwischenruf zu korrigieren. Die Fokussierung auf Achmadinedschad beruhe auf einem Missverständnis des iranischen Systems und seiner Machtstruktur, schreibt Slackman:

In demonizing Mr. Ahmadinejad, the West has served him well, elevating his status at home and in the region at a time when he is increasingly isolated politically because of his go-it-alone style and ineffective economic policies, according to Iranian politicians, officials and political experts.

Political analysts here say they are surprised at the degree to which the West focuses on their president, saying that it reflects a general misunderstanding of their system.

Unlike in the United States, in Iran the president is not the head of state nor the commander in chief. That status is held by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, whose role combines civil and religious authority. At the moment, this president’s power comes from two sources, they say: the unqualified support of the supreme leader, and the international condemnation he manages to generate when he speaks up.

“The United States pays too much attention to Ahmadinejad,” said an Iranian political scientist who spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal. “He is not that consequential.”

That is not to say that Mr. Ahmadinejad is insignificant. He controls the mechanics of civil government, much the way a prime minister does in a state like Egypt, where the real power rests with the president. He manages the budget and has put like-minded people in positions around the country, from provincial governors to prosecutors. His base of support is the Basiji militia and elements of the Revolutionary Guards.

But Mr. Ahmadinejad has not shown the same political acumen at home as he has in riling the West. Two of his ministers have quit, criticizing his stewardship of the state. The head of the central bank resigned. The chief judge criticized him for his management of the government. His promise to root out corruption and redistribute oil wealth has run up against entrenched interests…

Weiterlesen.

Aus meinem Artikel über den französischen Aussenminister Nicolas Sarkozy, zu lesen in der aktuellen Print-Ausgabe (Nr. 39) der ZEIT:
(…)
Für die Deutschen, die stolz darauf sind, die EU-Troika mit Briten und Franzosen zusammengehalten und auch Russen und Chinesen hinter die ersten beiden Sanktionsrunden gebracht zu haben, bedeutet diese Initiative eine doppelte Pro­vo­ka­tion. Erstens ist sie wieder nicht abgestimmt. Zweitens, und das ist schmerzhafter, rührt sie an die Schwachstelle der deutschen Iranpolitik. Ist es nicht richtig, den diplomatischen Kurs zu verschärfen, wenn man den Krieg vermeiden will, wie es Sarkozy und Kouchner sagen? Auch unter Berliner Außenpolitikern gibt es Zweifel, ob die Geschlossenheit im Rahmen der UN es wert ist, sich weiter auf Sanktionen zu beschränken, die möglicherweise zu harmlos sind, um Iran zu einem anderen Verhalten zu bewegen. Frankreich will diesen Konsenszwang jetzt durchbrechen. Aber wie weit geht der neue proamerikanische Kurs? Ein französischer Diplomat sagt es so: Der Präsident liebt Amerika, aber er wird für George Bush nicht Selbstmord begehen wie Tony Blair.

Der Hyperpräsident und die First Lady Foto: White House

Wie lange der Präsident sein atemberauben­des Tempo halten kann, fragen sich nicht nur die Berliner und Brüsseler Politiker, sondern auch seine zugleich erschöpften und euphorisierten Diplomaten: »Wir haben nach vier Monaten immer noch keine Ahnung, was seine normale Betriebsgeschwindigkeit ist.« Wer sagt eigentlich, dass es so etwas bei ihm gibt?

Mehr an einem Kiosk Ihres Vertrauens.
(Ich habe die aussenpolitische Berichterstattung im Berliner Büro der ZEIT übernommen. Das wird sich auch hier auf dem Blog niederschlagen.)

Die iranische Homosexuellenorganisation IRQO berichtet folgende Barbarei aus dem Leben zweier junger Schwuler:

Diese beiden Männer wurden nach Angaben der IRQO im Mai ausgepeitscht, weil sie eine Party für ihre schwulen Freunde gegeben haben.

Farsad is 26 years old and Farnam is 24, (their names have been changed to protect their identities). Their lives, like many, if not all the other Lesbians and Gays in Iran, is miserable. Farsad lost his father at fifteen and his mother re-married a revolutionary guard member (a military organism developed by the Iranian regime), which itself is a bitter story. „since childhood I could not find any attraction to the opposite sex; yes of course I am a homosexual.“ Farsad says.

At 21, in order to meet other people like himself, he set up a successful weblog. The secret police found his address through his IP and arrested him. He spent three weeks in solitary confinement, and then he was accused of obscenity, advocating decadent values and homosexuality. They sentenced him to six month in prison. After completing his sentence he suffered from depression and phobia about revealing his identity and going back to prison, with symptoms so debilitating he was hospitalized. Then his diary was found by his stepfather, who demanded Farsad denounce his homosexuality.

When Farsad resisted, his step-father took him to Qom (a holy city in Iran, and a center of Ayatollahs) to be seen by the grand ayatollahs; He spent a few nights in custody, was humiliated by the security forces there. They threatened him with stoning unless he denounced his homosexuality.

Traumatized by the threats, he was then taken to see a grand ayatollah, where he signed his confession and forgiveness plea. He was then returned to Tehran, where he received 95 lashes before being released. Almost as an afterthought, he was questioned by the supreme leader’s office in the university where he was studying — and was expelled from school, as well.

Last winter, he met Farnam in a gay chat room. After corresponding they moved in together to start life as a couple, in disguise but together. They invited a small group of their friends to celebrate this union. Just fifteen minutes after the party began, the police broke into their house and arrested everyone. They were brutally beaten, says Farsad, and then transported to a police detention center. They spent the entire Persian new year holidays in a prison cell. „We were beaten to the point that my spine hurt permanently; I still feel the pain caused by the fists pounding my face“, Farsad says.

They were accused of advocating decadency, homosexuality and prostitution. Because they were arrested together, the authorities insisted on more details about their relationship. During the police interrogation, they were asked, „Did you have sexual intercourse with each other?“ They did not admit to this question, and eventually they were sentenced for having an improper relationship, for which they received 80 lashes. All other guests were released conditionally and they were ordered to remain in the city and not get in-touch with each other.

Two weeks before the execution of their sentence, the party attendees were arrested again and were sentenced to 60 lashes each, which all received in the same day. Farsad and Farnam were told that 80 lashes was just for holding the party, and that their sentence for the improper relationship would be executed later.

Ahmadinedschad, der Fussballer?

Diese Fotos kursieren in iranischen Zirkeln. Sie sollen den heutigen iranischen Präsidenten 1976 in einem Fussballteam zeigen, ohne Bart und mit kurzen Hosen. In seinem Land ist (wäre) das ein Politikum.