Meint George Packer im New Yorker, dem die bisherigen Äusserungen der amerikanischen Regierung viel zu mutlos sind. Realismus soll kein Fetisch werden, meint Packer, und keine Entschuldigung fürs Zusehen bei einer brutalen Unterdrückung:

I understand that the Administration wants to let the chaos in Iran play itself out without committing to a position that might be rendered hollow by events. I understand and agree with its continued insistence on pursuing a policy of negotiation that’s in America’s interest. I understand that this head-on collision between interests and values is not at all easy to navigate. But “realism” should no more be an ideological fetish under Obama than “freedom” was under Bush. …

With riot police and armed militiamen beating and, in a few reported cases, killing unarmed demonstrators in the streets of Iran’s cities, for the Obama Administration to continue parsing equivocal phrases serves no purpose other than to make it look feckless. Part of realism is showing that you have a clear grasp of reality—that you know the difference between decency and barbarism when both are on display for the whole world to see. A stronger American stand—taken, as much as possible, in concert with European countries and through multilateral organizations—would do more to improve America’s negotiating position than weaken it. Acknowledging the compelling voices of the desperate young Iranians who, after all, only want their votes counted, would not deep-six the possibility of American-Iranian talks. Ahmadinejad and his partners in the clerical-military establishment will talk to us exactly when and if they think it’s in their interest. Right now, they don’t appear to. And the tens of millions of Iranians who voted for change and are the long-term future of that country will always remember what America said and did when they put their lives on the line for their values.

Das Problem bei einer stärkeren Einmischung der USA ist meiner Ansicht nach dies: Man liefert die Opposition noch mehr der Regierungspropaganda aus, sie sei vom Westen ferngesteuert und verfolge die Interessen der Feinde Irans.
Den Punkt zu treffen, an dem man sich von dieser Rücksichtnahme frei machen sollte, ist schwer. Man will ja nicht noch zusätzliche Vorwände liefern, die Unterdrückung zu forcieren.

Der berühmte iranische Filmemacher Mohsen Makhmalbaf – ein Vertrauter Mussawis – vergleicht die Ereignisse im Iran im Gespräch mit Rooz Online mit dem Coup gegen Mossadegh von 1953:

Rooz: What do you call this event?

Makhmalbaf: This is more than just election rigging. People are shocked and resemble those of 1953 when a coup against nationalist leader Mossadegh took place. Then too people expected Mossadegh to win, but they lost him. Today people are in a state of shock, and I call this a coup d’état. This is more than just rigging. We must all say in unison: There has been a coup. This coup is of course not in favor of a dictatorship because what is important is that people have succeeded in pushing back dictatorship to the wall and so the state has been forced to forsake its legitimacy for dictatorship. Until this event, Iranian people and the world believed that in comparison with such countries as Iraq during Saddam Hussein which was a dictatorship, Iran had a relative democracy. People said that even though there are things like a clerical leadership, Guardian Council etc in Iran, the very fact that we can elect someone like Mohammad Khatami instead of an Ahmadinejad shows there is relative choice and election. Today however with this event, we have completely returned to the 1953 situation.

Mohsen Makhmalbaf Photo: iranchamber.com

…

Rooz: What is the future?

Don’t you see the weakness of dictatorship? Do you see the fear that dictatorship has from this expose? Do you see that people have identified the dictatorship after 30 years? This was the victory of our people which in fact was accomplished with minimum cost. Today, we must maintain this unity. They still can put pressure on leaders that have emerged from people. They can push Mousavi into his house but they cannot imprison 70 million people, or kill them. One cannot ask 70 million people to forego their natural and basic rights. Especially as the international society is moving towards peace. Prior to this, there was the threat of an American attack and that was used as an excuse to militarize the country. But with a new president in the US one cannot use that argument and excuse any more, and we cannot be frightened with that. No one can militarize the country any longer. The military is not to suppress the nation.

Die Frage aller Fragen im Iran. Mit diesem Logo liefen viele heute auf den Demos herum. Manche riefen auch: „Ahmadi, wo sind Deine 24 Millionen?“ Angesichts der Masse von Menschen auf den Strassen – nicht nur in Teheran, auch in den anderen Zentren der Islamischen Republik wie Kerman, Schiraz, Maschhad – eine schlagende Formel.

Die Islamische Republik ist zwar ein tyrannisches Regime. Aber weil sie aus einer breit getragenen Revolution hervorgegangen ist, die immer noch die Legtimationsgrundlage darstellt, darf sie das Volk nicht verlieren. Das unterscheidet Iran von unfreien Gesellschaften der Region wie Ägypten oder Syrien, in denen solche Szenen, wie wir sie dieser Tage sehen, undenkbar wären.

Auch heute Nacht wieder waren die Allahu akbar Rufe zu hören über den Dächern. Für die Regierenden muss das schauerlich klingen – denn mit diesen Rufen hatte auch Chomeinis Revolution gegen den Schah begonnen.

Für morgen ist zu einem Generalstreik aufgerufen.

p.s. Hilfreiche Websites: Andrew Sullivans Blog (in Weltmeisterform!) und Tehranbureau.

Aufnahmen, die zeigen, welches Ausmass die Demonstrationen in Teheran angenommen haben. Die Menge ruft immer wieder: Tod dem Diktator! Und wirkt völlig angstfrei. Das Ende der Tyrannei?

Gary Sick, der für mehrere US-Regierungen Iranpolitik gemacht hat, hält den Wahlbetrug im Iran für einen Wendepunkt in der Geschichte des islamischen Systems – und rät doch zu weiteren Verhandlungen: Das ganze hoch interessante Interview auf der Website des Council on Foreign Relations:

Why do you think Khamenei moved like this? He had to have given his approval to this whole internal coup. Do you think he himself was scared of losing power?

The role of the Supreme Leader is deliberately shrouded in mystery. It’s one of those things that people in Iran speculate about. There are all kinds of conspiracy theories that perhaps Khamenei didn’t know about this, or that he was accidentally behind it and so forth. We never know the truth. And he keeps his counsel to himself. Several of Khamenei’s supporters have come out publicly-people like Ali Larijani, who is the speaker of the Majlis [parliament], and who, though a bitter opponent of Ahmadinejad, has now gone public in support of the election. This is probably not so much about what happened in the election as it is a reiteration of Larijani’s position that he supports the Supreme Leader. And if that is the case-if he is in fact making this statement even though he personally is opposed to Ahmadinejad-that suggests that the Supreme Leader wanted this to happen and is requesting that his closest lieutenants back him up on this. So on the basis of the evidence we’ve got so far, my reading is that it couldn’t have happened without Khamenei’s knowledge; it was much too orchestrated and premeditated, and now that it’s over, supporters of Khamenei are coming in to support him.

It looks like the votes were never really counted, they just decided to announce a victory, right?

The timing of the thing suggests if in fact there was a record turnout, 85 percent to 86 percent of the population voting, the fact that they could announce the results about the time the polls closed or not very long afterwards, obviously, even if they had the world’s best voting machines, they would not have been able to do that. And they don’t use voting machines-they have people dropping their ballots into boxes which have to be opened and counted. The fact that this was a stolen election is not in doubt at all. The kind of information they put out-and then the fact that as the polls were closing they deployed police and military forces and paramilitary all over Tehran-they surrounded the Interior Ministry-they closed down Facebook sites, Twitter, mobile phones were all turned off, and regular news sites were blocked. Those things don’t happen instantly-they had to be planned, they had to be organized. And the reality is that they were expecting a severe reaction, which is what they got, and they were fully prepared to meet force with force. And that is what they have done.

Do you think the events of June 12 and 13 will be remembered by Iranians as they still remember the events of August 1953 when Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh was overthrown in a coup that was backed by the United States and Britain?

I really do see this as a kind of historic turning point. A commentator from Iran just today sent me a note saying that the Islamic republic is dead, that basically it was based on a concept of listening to the people and having the support of the people for Islamic programs. That was the nature of the Islamic constitution and it’s what [Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi] Khomeini [Iran’s first Supreme Leader] said he wanted to do. In effect now they are saying „forget about the Iranian people-we don’t care what they say or what they think. We’re not going to listen to them.“ Basically it means that Iran is moving from what had been a decent experiment of being an Islamic Republic to being a totalitarian dictatorship. Now it isn’t at that point yet but it is a step in that direction which is going to be unmistakable to a lot of people in Iran and they will remember this. How will it resonate fifty years from now, I don’t know. But it clearly demonstrated to many, many people in Iran that they were simply ignored. They had been asked to go out and vote; they had been allowed a certain amount of freedom to say what they thought. There were demonstrations, there was great excitement. Then the regime simply thumbs its nose at them and says, „OK, that was a mistake, now we’re going to tell you what you need to do.“

Die Menschen verabreden sich über Twitter, auf die Dächer der Hochhäuser Teherans zu steigen und „Allahu akbar“ zu rufen:

Bemerkenswert, welche Filme überall im Netz auftauchen über die Aufstände im Iran. Hier sieht man paramilitärische Polizei auf Passanten an einer Haltestelle eindreschen.
Und dann geht eine junge Frau auf einen der gepanzerten Robocops los – der sie natürlich wieder schlägt. Und schließlich sieht man eine ganze Gruppe von Polizisten auf Motorrädern vorbeirauschen, alle in Sicherheitsmontur.
Ich finde das bemerkenswert. Diese Leute leben seit dreißig Jahren in einer Diktatur. Aber sie lassen sich weder von der Macht der anderen noch von der eigenen Ohnmacht in die Resignation zwingen:

Quelle.

Tehranbureau hat einen Text online gestellt, der angeblich von dem unterlegenen Kandidaten Mir Hussein Mussawi stammt:

I object fully to the current procedures and obvious and abundant deviations from law on the day of election and alert people to not surrender to this dangerous plot. Dishonesty and corruption of officials as we have seen will only result in weakening the pillars of the Islamic Republic of Iran and empowers lies and dictatorships.

I am obliged, due to my religious and national duties, to expose this dangerous plot and to explain its devastating effects on the future of Iran. I am concerned that the continuation of the current situation will transform all key members of this regime into fabulists in confrontation with the nation and seriously jeopardize them in this world and the next.

Mehr lesen.

In Israel macht sich Erleichterung über das „Wahlergebnis“ im Iran breit. Und diese Erleichterung, wie sie exemplarisch in einem Editorial der linksliberalen Tageszeitung Ha’aretz zum Ausdruck kommt, ist keineswegs irrational oder zynisch.

Es ist auch eine Erleichterung darüber, dass Israel nun nicht wie der sprichwörtliche einsame Mahner in der Wüste dastehen wird, wenn es um Irans Atomprogramm und um den aggressiven, gefährlichen Charakter des Teheraner Regimes geht.

Die Welt wird es schwerer haben, so die Logik, sich Illusionen über die Gesprächs- und Verhandlungsbereitschaft der Ajatollahs zu machen, wenn abermals Ahmadinedschad das Gesicht des Regimes sein wird.

Und da ist durchaus etwas dran: Mussawi hätte – ebenso wie der „liberale“ Präsident Chatami in seiner Amtszeit – das Atomprogramm vorangetrieben (beziehungsweise treiben lassen, denn die Entscheidung darüber liegt beim „Führer“ Chamenei). Er hätte es aber leichter gehabt, im Westen durch scheinbare Konzilianz den Eindruck zu erwecken, es gebe Spielraum für Verhandlungen.

In Israel sind nun auch viele erleichtert, dass man nicht im Zuge der neuen Obama’schen Nahostpolitik marginalisiert und als „das eigentliche Problem“ im Nahen Osten betrachtet werden wird.

Und schließlich schafft die Wieder“wahl“ Ahmadinedschads eine größere Wahrscheinlichkeit für eine Allianz mit den „moderaten“ Arabern, die sich ebenso vom Iran bedroht sehen wie die Israelis. Voraussetzung für eine solche Allianz wäre allerdings, dass sich Israel im Hinblick auf die Siedlungen und die Lage der Palästinenser im allgemeinen deutlich bewegt. Denn ohne Erfolge auf diesen Gebieten könnten die Regime kaum rechtfertigen, dass sie sich mit Amerika und Israel gegen Teheran stellen, um dessen Einfluß einzudämmen und seine Atombewaffnung zu verhindern.

Und in dieser Hinsicht wird sehr viel von Benjamin Netanjahus heutiger Rede zum Nahostprozeß ankommen. Wird er von einer Zweistaatenlösung reden? Jetzt ist seine Stunde. Die Iraner haben ihm eine exzellente Bühne verschafft!

p.s. Hier der Kern des Kommentars aus Ha’aretz zur Wahl im Iran:

„And in this case, paradoxically, it seems that from Israel’s point of view the victory of incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is actually preferable. Not only because „better the devil you know,“ but because the victory of the pro-reform candidate will paste an attractive mask on the face of Iranian nuclear ambitions.

Western experts now agree that even during the tenure of moderate president Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), the nuclear program continued to advance. And in any case, the person who really decides on the nuclear issue is not the president but the spiritual leader. One of the president’s advisers even made it clear recently, in an interview with Reuters, that the spiritual leader will continue to shape his country’s nuclear policy, regardless of the election results.

Ahmadinejad, with his Holocaust denial and his long series of provocations, drew most of the attention, but apparently had less influence on the nuclear program. There are even senior members of the Israeli defense establishment who share the public stance of former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy, who claimed that the Iranian president’s behavior, perceived in the West as quasi-lunatic, advanced Israel’s security interests.“

Und  dies ist die Conclusio der unabhängigen Website Tehranbureau:

[TEHRAN BUREAU] Iran’s Interior Ministry has declared President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the winner of yesterday’s election. This has been rejected by all the three opponents of Mr. Ahmadinejad, Messrs Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mahdi Karroubi, and Mohsen Rezaaee.

The best evidence for the validity of the arguments of the three opponents of the President for rejecting the results declared by the Interior Ministry is the data the Ministry itself has issued. In the chart, compiled based on the data released by the Ministry and announced by Iran’s national television, a perfect linear relation between the votes received by the President and Mir Hossein Mousavi has been maintained, and the President’s vote is always half of the President’s. The vertical axis (y) shows Mr. Mousavi’s votes, and the horizontal (x) the President’s. R^2 shows the correlation coefficient: the closer it is to 1.0, the more perfect is the fit, and it is 0.9995, as close to 1.0 as possible for any type of data.

Statistically and mathematically, it is impossible to maintain such perfect linear relations between the votes of any two candidates in any election — and at all stages of vote counting. This is particularly true about Iran, a large country with a variety of ethnic groups who usually vote for a candidate who is ethnically one of their own. For example, in the present elections, Mr. Mousavi is an Azeri and speaks Turkish. The Azeries make up 1/4 of all the eligible voters in Iran and in his trips to Azerbaijan province, where most of the Azeri population lives, Mr. Mousavi had been greeted by huge rallies in support of his campaign. Likewise, Mr. Karroubi, the other reformist candidate, is a Lor. But according to the data released by Iran’s Interior Ministry, in both cases, Mr. Ahmadinejad has far outdone both candidates in their own provinces of birth and among their own ethnic populations.

Noch mehr Indizien bei Juan Cole.